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Abstract The main aim of this paper is to 
introduce the network averaging technique.  This 
technique is introduced because accurately determining 
the structure of real networks can be difficult and the 
network averaging technique provides a proxy for real 
networks.  A second aim is to introduce the adaptive 
interactive expectations (AIE) model, which uses a 
‘pressure to change profit expectations index’ to 
replace the utility curve maximising agent concept.  
The AIE model has an interactive expectations 
network, which is difficult to determine, so suitable to 
illustrate network averaging.  The AIE model is tested 
against the Dun and Bradstreet Profit Expectations 
Survey.  The paper finds network averaging improves 
the predictive performance of AIE over its 
benchmarks: the rational expectations hypothesis and 
the adaptive expectations model.  The network 
averaging technique could be adapted to other 
situations where there are endogenous effects acting 
through difficult to measure networks.  The AIE model 
could be readily applied to other forms of expectations 
and as a replacement for the utility curve maximising 
agent.  Finally, in this paper AIE models profit 
expectations, which are an important issue in their own 
right because they affect investment decisions and 
whether one business will extend credit to another 
business. 
Keywords Networks, interactive, adaptive, 
model averaging, profit 
 
JEL Classification B41, B52, C53, C61, C63, 
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1 Introduction 
Much of the agent based modelling simulates 
emergence and makes predictions against stylised facts 
as a form of falsification to improve their scientific 
veracity.  However critics of agent based modelling 
point to the large number of parameters required for 
calibration.  Adding to this criticism is the lack of 
assurance of the accurate depiction of networks.  This 
concern is valid given that the dynamics of a network 
can change substantially if a link or node is incorrectly 
recorded.  These criticisms are in part responsible for 
the reluctance of practitioners to adopt agent based 
modelling for policy development (Dawid & Fagiolo 
2008, p. 352).  This paper addresses these worthy 
criticisms by developing a network averaging 
technique that uses history to constrain the parameter 
values of models over a set of networks structures.  
Each network structure is a model in its own right, so 
model averaging (Bates & Granger 1969) over the 
network structures becomes feasible to improve 
temporal predictive performance. 
 
Model averaging across these network structures act as 
a proxy to capture the dynamics in the real network 
without the need to measure the network directly.  Both 
temporal prediction, which allows benchmarking 
against alternative models, and constraining the 
parameter values using history adds to the scientific 
veracity of the network averaging technique.  The 
paper uses the Adaptive Interactive Expectations (AIE) 
model to illustrate the technique. 
2 Adaptive Interactive 
Expectations Model 
The AIE model combines models from the literature to 
produce a subjective temporal predictive expectations 
model.  Table 1 uses Beinhocker’s (2006, p. 185) three 
factors affecting emergence in an economic system to 
framework the discussion of the literature supporting 
the component parts of the AIE model.  The three 
factors are: exogenous inputs, the behavior of 
participants and the structure of institutions.  Keynes’ 
(1937, pp. 213-4) “uncertain knowledge” forms the 
conceptual link between exogenous inputs and the 
behaviour of participants for the AIE model, but this 
conceptual link is in narrative form only.  However, 
Hicks’ (1939) Adaptive Expectations does provide a 
temporal predictive model linking the two factor, 
which encapsulates Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) 
“adjustment and anchoring heuristic”.  The AIE 
model uses the Adaptive Expectations model (Hicks 
1939) to link the first two factors in Table 1. 
 
In comparison to the temporal predictive Adaptive 
Expectations model, both the Interactive Expectations 
(Flieth & Foster 2002) and Social Interaction (Bowden 
& McDonald 2006) models use stylised facts for 
falsification and link the first two factors in Table 1 
with narrative and assumption respectively.  The 
assumption in Social Interaction (Bowden & 
McDonald 2006) is that the beliefs or expectations 
converge to the state of the world.  Figure 1 shows that 
this is not the case for the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B 
2008) profit expectations survey, requiring the 
separation of beliefs from outcomes or probabilities 
(Eichberger, Kelsey & Schipper 2009; Ellsberg 1961).  
Figure 1 shows an optimism bias, which is 
incorporated in the equation (1).  A further difference 
between the Interactive Expectations (Flieth & Foster 
2002) and Social Interaction (Bowden & McDonald 
2006) models is that they model interactions using 
statistical mechanical and network approaches 
respectively.  The advantage of the network over 
statistical mechanical approach is that networks can act 
as a proxy for instructional structure.  Social 
Interactions (Bowden & McDonald 2006) use the small 
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world network approach of Watts and Strogatz (1998).  
The AIE model adopts this approach also but AIE 
provides for temporal prediction.   
Table 1 Factors affecting emergence in an economic system and correspondence to AIE 
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Figure 1 shows the D&B (2008) profit expectations 
and actual profit indices.  The dataset the AIE model is 
tested against.  The respondents to the D&B (2008) 
survey state whether their actual profits increased, 
decreased or underwent no-change the previous quarter 
and whether they expect their profits to increase, 
decrease or undergo no-change in the following 
quarter.  The change in profit rather than level or state 
of profit encapsulates Kahneman and Traversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory and the “primacy of change 
over state” (Kahneman 2002).  An approach AIE takes 
but at odd with utility curve maximizing agents.  The 
Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu Theorem (Debreu 1959) 
proves the neoclassic framework is logically 
inconsistent, which uses the utility curve maximizing 
agents as a basic axiom (Arnsperger & Varoufakis 
2006; Farmer & Geanakoplos 2008; Keen 2001).  
Farmer and Geanakoplos (2008) call for alternative 
approaches to the utility curve maximizing agents to 
model choice.  This paper introduce the ‘pressure to 
change profit expectations index’ px as an alternative.  
To test the AIE model, the D&B (2008) profit indices 
are decomposed into the percentage of business with a 
decrease, increase and no-change in profits for both 
their expectations and actualization indices.  Lacking a 
better alternative, the percentage of business expecting 
no-change in profits from the ABS (2002 Cat. No. 
5250.0 tbl. 2) aids in the decomposition.  The number 
of firms or business in AIE is n = 200 because Bowden 
and MacDonald (2006) use n = 200 and n = 400 in 
their Social Expectations model and find little 
difference in the results but a large saving in computing 
time.  From the percentage breakdowns each business i 
at time t is assigned a level of expectations ei,t of 1, 0 or 
–1 to represent whether they expect profits to increase, 
undergo no–change or to decrease.  The actualisations 
ai,t are assigned similarly.  So far these assignments 
reflect the D&B (2008) indices.   
2.1 Justification for the pressure to 
change profit expectations index px 
This section makes two arguments to justify the use of 
the index px, rather than use probabilities.  
2.1.1 The need for an Alternative Measure of 
Belief to Outcome or Probability 
There are three aspects to why there is a need for an 
alternative measure of belief to outcome or probability.  
First, how people have an asymmetry in their attitude 
toward “risk”, which is at odds with probability theory 
and requires modelling with weights.  Second, how 
people are “ambiguity” adverse, which is at odds with 
the Bayesian approach, requiring techniques to weight 
non-additive multiple probability distributions 
representing differing beliefs.  Third, how there is a 
substantial gap between the D&B profit expectations 
and actual profits indices indicating an optimism bias.  
These three aspects are addressed in turn.  
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduce prospect 
theory as an alternative decision making theory to Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) rational choice.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that replacing 
probabilities with weights provides a more accurate 
description and prediction of people’s decision making, 
finding people are “risk” adverse in gains but “risk” 
seeking in losses.   
 
Ellsberg (1961) provides evidence that peoples beliefs 
cause people to act at odds with the Bayesian approach, 
calling into question the applicability of conventional 
probabilities to beliefs.  Camerer and Weber (1992) 
discuss ambiguity or the uncertainty about 
probabilities, finding people are “ambiguity averse”.  
They observe this in a dozen or so experiments 
confirming Ellsberg’s (1961) findings.  Eichberger, 
Kelsey and Schipper (2009) discuss ambiguity in social 
interaction, stating that ‘A decision-maker is said to 
have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to 
be represented by a single probability distribution.’ 
Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2009) cite Knight 
(1921) contrasting risk where probabilities are known 
with ambiguity where probability can not be assigned.  
They claim ambiguity is common place; for example 
the probability of the success of a peace negotiation or 
the likely impact of a new technology.  However they 
note that Savage’s (1954) subjective decision making 
theory has made the distinction between ambiguity and 
risk from an analytical point of view obsolete because 
beliefs are represented by a probability distribution.  
This view on the demise of the distinction is consistent 
with Vercelli (2007, p. 21) discussed in section 2.1.2.  
Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2009) use a Choquet 
(1954) expected utility framework to generalise the 
subjective expected utility because “it maintains the 
separation of beliefs and outcome evaluation, which 
makes the theory easier to apply in economics and 
social sciences.”  
 
Further to the need to separate belief from probability 
and outcome, Figure 1 shows a persistent optimism 
bias as the profit expectations exceed the actual profits 
for almost the entire history of the D&B survey.  This 
contrasts to Bowden and MacDonald (2006) who use a 
Bayesian approach to model the price movements of 
shares.  In their model, they assume that agents find the 
true state of the world after a price change given a lag.  
Figure 1 shows that the firms never seem to learn the 
true state of the world.  This is a form of optimism bias 
and is reflected in the calculation of px, see section 
2.2.1.1. 
Figure 1 All–firms Profit Expectations and Actual Profits Indices 
 
(Source: D&B 2008) 
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2.1.2 Probability in Stationary Decision Theory 
versus Unknowables in Adaptive Processes 
The second argument for using an index rather than 
probabilities hinges on the more pure form of 
uncertainty, the unknowable.  Vercelli (2007, p. 21) 
and Keynes (1937) make the unknowable argument 
using different approaches: axiomatically and the 
inability to measure the value of current additions to 
investments respectively.  Vercelli (2007, p. 21) notes 
that the objective and subjective decision making 
theories may appear very different.  However their 
implications are almost identical axiomatically and 
ontologically because both theories refer to a world 
that is familiar to the decision maker.  As Lucas (1986, 
p. S411) notes “the economic theory of choice is ... a 
description of a ... stationary ‘point’ ... [in a] dynamic 
adaptive process.”  At such a point, the optimal 
adaptation has already happened and the decision 
maker knows the complete list of its possible states and 
options, and knows the consequences of each choice 
for each possible state.  However in an environment 
where there are innovations and true learning, 
providing novel states and outcomes that were formerly 
unknown, it is not possible to attribute probabilities.  
Such a situation requires a dynamic adaptive approach. 
 
Keynes (1937, pp. 213-4) discusses “uncertain” 
knowledge claiming that probabilities relating to the 
relatively distant future are not measurable because 
"the prospect of a European war" or "the rate of 
interest twenty years hence" are so uncertain that "there 
is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever.  We simply do not know".  The 
probabilities of events affecting the value of current 
additions to capital are not measurable.  Therefore, the 
present value of current investment cannot be 
calculated.  He suggests that people adopt the 
following three strategies in the face of uncertainty.   
1. Assume the present is a much more servable guide 
to the future than the past and largely ignore the 
unknowns in the future.  This is a form of 
exponential discounting and is reflected in the 
calculation of px, see section 2.2.1.3. 
2. Assume the existing state of opinion is reflected in 
the prices and the characteristic of existing output 
is a correct summing up of future prospects, unless 
something new and relevant comes into the 
picture.  This is a dynamic adaptive expectations 
approach and is reflected in the calculation of px, 
see section 2.2.1.3.   
3. Knowing our own judgement worthless, fall back 
on the judgement of the rest of the world, so doing 
conform to the behaviour of the majority or 
average, leading to a “conventional” judgement.  
This is an interactive expectations approach and is 
reflected in the calculation of px, see section 
2.2.1.2. 
2.2 Pressure to change profit 
expectations index px 
The px index provides a non-probabilistic method to 
enable the summing of pressures that can change the 
profit expectations of an individual firm from three 
sources: interactive pressure, adaptive pressure and 
biases, which can be optimism, pessimism or 
ambivalence.  The px index is used to determine 
stochastically whether a firm changes its profit 
expectations. 
 
The structure of the section follows.  Section 2.2.1 
discusses the calculation of px.  Section 2.2.2 discusses 
how px is used stochastically to determine whether a 
firm changes expectations.  Section 2.2.3 discusses 
how the maximum and minimum px is restricted to be 
100 and –100 respectively. 
2.2.1 Calculating the Pressure to Change Profit 
Expectations Index 
This section discusses how the pxi,t is calculated for 
each firm i each quarter t.  Equation (1) shows the 
calculation of the px for: (a) firms who currently expect 
profits to decrease; (b) firms who currently expect no 
change in profits; and (c) firms who currently expect 
profits to increase.  The px in each equation has three 
main components: the interactive and adaptive 
influences and the biases.  The biases include 
optimism, pessimism and ambivalence.  The interactive 
influence uses the difference between profit 
expectations of the firm and those firms linked to it; 
plus this difference is normalised and put to a power 
ranging between 1 and 3 by increments of 0.2. The 
adaptive influence uses the error between the expected 
profits and actual profits for the current and the 
previous period.  This section discusses these 
components and compares them to the interactive 
expectations and adaptive expectations from which the 
AIE model is developed. 
 
The structure of the section follows.  Section one 
discusses the three biases: optimism, ambivalence and 
pessimism.  Section two discusses the interactive 
influence and interactive power.  Section three 
discusses the adaptive influences.  
2.2.1.1 Biases: Optimism, Ambivalence or 
Pessimism 
The basic tendencies β in equation (1) are, as the name 
suggests, the tendency for a firm to feel pressure to 
change to another level of expectations.  The basic 
tendency to increase β+, to decrease β– and to be 
neutral β0 could be interpreted respectively as 
optimism, pessimism, or ambivalent feelings that 
permeate the economy.  Looking at Figure 1, it appears 
that there are overly optimistic expectations, because 
profit expectations exceed actual profit for most of the 
time, so one would predict that the basic tendency to 
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increase is greater than the basic tendency to decrease.  The AIE model does find this to be the case. 
 
Equation (1) – Pressure to change profit expectations index 
(a) For firm i who currently expects profits to decrease (ei,t = –1) 
 The pressure to increase expectations 
 pxi,t = β+ + β0 + A [ ai,t – ei,t ] + A–1 [ ai,t–1 – ei,t–1 ] + I [ (Li,t+ + Li,t0) / L ]^δ 
(b) For firm i who currently expects no change in profits (ei,t = 0) 
 positive pressure to increase expectations and  
 negative pressure to decrease expectations 
 pxi,t = β+ – β– + A [ ai,t – ei,t ] + A–1 [ ai,t–1 – ei,t–1 ] + I [( Li,t+ / L )^δ – ( Li,t– / L )^δ] 
(c) For firm i who currently expects profits to increase (ei,t = 1) 
 The pressure to decrease expectations 
 pxi,t = β– + β0 + A [ ei,t – ai,t ] + A–1 [ ei,t–1 – ai,t–1 ] + I [ (Li,t– + Li,t0) / L ]^δ 
Where 
 pxi,t = pressure to change profit expectations index for firm i at time t 
  pxi,t  ∈  [–100, 100 ] 
 β+ = basic tendency to increase expectations – optimism bias 
 β0 = basic tendency to neutral expectations – ambivalence bias 
 β– = basic tendency to decrease expectations – pessimism bias 
 A = adaptive influence this quarter 
 A–1 = adaptive influence last quarter 
 ai,t = profit actualisation of firm i at time t  
  where a decrease, no change or increase is –1, 0 or 1 respectively 
 ei,t = profit expectations of firm i at time t 
  where a decrease, no change or increase is –1, 0 or 1 respectively 
 I = interactive influence 
 L = total number of links to a node or firm (2, 4, 6, …, 22) 
 L+ = the number of linked firms who expect profits to increase (e = 1) 
 L0 = the number of linked firms who expect no change in profits (e = 0) 
 L– = the number of linked firms who expect profits to decrease (e = –1) 
 δ = interactive power (1.0, 1.2, 1.4, …, 3.0) 
 
 
2.2.1.2 Interactive Influence and Interactive Power 
The interactive influence I in equation (1) indicates the 
influence of other firms holding differing levels of 
profit expectations have on the firm.  Each firm is 
linked to other firms via a network.  The total number 
of links to a firm L = Li,t+  +  Li,t0  +  Li,t– is the sum of 
the links to firms that hold optimistic, ambivalent and 
pessimistic expectations respectively.  Section 2.3 
discusses the 121 network topologies (L and ρ) and 
parameters ranges that AIE uses.  The AIE model 
borrows the network naming conventions and topology 
parameters from Watts and Strogatz’s (1998) small 
world networks, the code from Wilensky (2005), and 
parameter increments from Bowden and McDonald 
(2006).  This ensures that the design of the AIE 
model’s network builds upon the existing literature. 
 
The interactive power δ in equation (1) varies from 1 to 
3 by increments of 0.2.  These increments are chosen to 
test Flieth and Foster’s (2002) assumption that δ = 2.  
The interactive components are adapted from Flieth 
and Foster (2002) and Bowden and McDonald (2006).  
2.2.1.3 Adaptive Influence 
The adaptive influences A and A–1 in equation (1a) 
indicate the influence that the firm’s own expectations 
are met.  The adaptive influences weights are the 
parameters (ai,t – ei,t) and (ai,t–1 – ei,t–1), which form a 
link between the actual profits and profit expectations.  
For example, if the firm’s expectations are met that is 
(ai,t = ei,t) and (ai,t–1 = ei,t–1), the firm has zero pressure 
from adaptive influences to change profit expectations.  
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If the firm’s expectations are exceeded that is (ai,t > ei,t) 
or (ai,t–1 > ei,t–1), the adaptive influence increases 
pressure on the firm to increase its expectations.  The 
AIE model uses the current and last quarter only, 
reflecting the fact that a firm lacks full information 
about the actual profits for the current quarter until the 
following quarter, so a firm behaving adaptively would 
use the full information available from last quarter and 
the partial information available about this quarter.   
 
The adaptive expectations influence A is adapted from 
Hicks’ (1939) adaptive expectations.  This influence 
allows a connection between actual profits and profit 
expectations, which Flieth and Foster’s (2002) 
Interactive Expectations lacks.  
2.2.2 Stochastically Determining the Pressure 
Level at which to Change Expectations 
Equation (2) shows how the px in conjunction with a 
random number generator and the ‘pressure levels at 
which to change expectations’ p+, p++, p– and p– – 
determines the level of expectations a firm holds for 
the next quarter ei,t+1.  These values are aged and the 
process is repeated for each quarter to form a single 
run.  The random function in equation (2) reports a 
random integer greater than or equal to 0, but strictly 
less than the pressure to change level (Wilensky 1999).  
The random function uses a flat distribution. 
Once the AIE model calculates the expectations of each 
firm for each period, the ‘profit expectations index’ of 
the AIE model is calculated.  Table 1 compares the 
model variance between the ‘profit expectations index’ 
of the AIE and D&B survey for the best single run and 
the model averaging discussed next. 
 
Equation (2) – Determining the pressure level at which to change expectations 
(a) For firms who currently expect profits to decrease, determining the pressure  
level to increase expectations 
 if random (  p+  )  <  pxi,t  then  ei,t+1 = 0  
  the firm increases expectations one level  
 if random (  p++  –  p+  ) < (  pxi,t  –  p+  )  then ei,t+1 = 1 
  the firm increases expectations two levels 
(b) For firms who currently expect no change in profits determining the pressure 
level to increase or decrease profit expectations 
 if pxi,t  >  0  and if random(  p+   ) < abs(  pxi,t  )  then  ei,t+1  =  1  
  the firm increases expectations one level 
 if pxi,t < 0 and if random(  p–   ) <  abs(  pxi,t  )  then  ei,t+1  =  –1 
  the firm decreases expectations one level 
 (c) For firms who currently expect profits to increase  
 The pressure to decrease expectations 
 if random (  p–  )  <  pxi,t  then  ei,t+1  =  0 
  the firm decreases expectations one level  
 if random (  p– –  –  p–  )  <  (  pxi,t  –  p–  )  then  ei,t+1  =  –1 
  the firm decreases expectations two levels 
Where 
p+ = the pressure level at which a firm increases profit expectations by 1 level 
p++ = the pressure level at which a firm increases profit expectations by 2 levels 
p– = the pressure level at which a firm decreases profit expectations by 1 level 
p– – = the pressure level at which a firm decreases profit expectations by 2 levels 
ei,t+1 = profit expectations the firm holds next quarter  
 
 
2.2.3 Constraining px to ±100 
Equation (3) ensures that the px does not exceed 100.  
Line 1 in equation (3) shows how the px is constrained 
to a maximum of 100 by setting px in equation (1a) to 
100.  The parameters ai,t, ei,t, ai,t–1 and ei,t–1 can all take 
the values 1, 0 or –1, so the maximum values for [ ai,t – 
ei,t ] or [ ai,t–1 – ei,t–1 ] is 2.  This could result in 
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doubling the weight of A or A–1 on the px, so the factor 
of 2 introduced in line 2 of equation (3).  The 
maximum value for (Li,t+ + Li,t0) / L is 1, so a factor of 
1 is introduced in line 2 of equation (3) for I.  The 
constraint in line 2 allows β0 to be determined in line 3 
with the condition that β0 is not less than zero.  This 
constraint allows the elimination of β0 from the 
parameter sweeping.  
Equation (3) – Fixing the maximum px to 100 
1. 100 >= β+ + β0 + A [ ai,t – ei,t ] + A–1 [ ai,t–1 – ei,t–1 ] 
+ I [ (Li,t+ + Li,t0) / L ]^δ 
2. 100  >=  β+ + β0 + I + 2 *  [ A + A–1 ] 
3. β0  =  100  –  (  β+  +  I  +  2 *  [ A + A–1 ]  ) 
  Where β0  >=  0 
2.3 Network Averaging 
The solution space for the model variance is nonlinear 
and unsuitable for a simple gradient search.  So, a 
combination of three search techniques is used: grid-
gradient, threshold accepting and unconstrained 
nonlinear optimization.  There is uncertainty over the 
interactive expectations network structure, so AIE 
model averages over 121 network structures.  The 
terminology for the networks is consistent with Watts 
and Strogatz (1998).  The increments for the 121 
networks are consistent with Bowden and MacDonald 
(2006): L ranges from 2 to 22 by increments of 2 and ρ 
ranges from 0 to 1 by increments of 0.1.  The model 
variance for each of the network structures is 
minimized.  Table 2 shows the equal weighted model 
averaging of the 121 network structures. 
2.4 The Adaptive Expectations Model 
as a Benchmark for AIE 
The adaptive expectations model forms a benchmark 
for AIE.  The adaptive expectations model is the AIE 
with the interactive component set to zero that is I = 0.  
The number of links is set to one L = 1 to prevent a 
divide by zero error.  For the aggregated adaptive 
expectations model a slightly lower model variance for 
the model averaging was found by setting the network 
topology to values other than L = 1 and ρ = 0.  Since I 
= 0, these alternate network topology settings only 
indirectly affect the model variance calculation because 
the random functions in the model are affected by 
using different values.  Bell (2009) discusses this issue 
further. 
2.5 The Rational Expectations 
Hypothesis as a Benchmark for AIE 
The REH provides a benchmark for AIE and needs to 
be made operational.  Sargent (2008, p. 1) asserts in 
rational expectations that outcomes do not differ 
systematically (i.e., regularly or predictable) from what 
people expect them to be.  To make this assertion 
operational and provide a benchmark for AIE requires 
finding the model variance for REH.  The model 
variance for REH is simply that between the D&B 
(2008) actual profit index and the profit expectations 
index. 
3 Results 
Table 2 compares the model variance from the 
calibration and prediction periods among the AIE, 
adaptive expectations and REH models. The calibration 
period is March 2000 to December 2006.  The 
prediction period is March 2006 to June 2007.  The 
REH requires no calibration as such.  The predictive 
performance of AIE is better than the adaptive 
expectations and REH models.  The programming code 
for the AIE model used to derive these results is 
available on a DVD as Appendix A to Bell (2009).  
Table 2 Comparing the model variance (SSE/T) of 
the AIE model against the rational expectations 
hypothesis and adaptive expectations 
Model Description 
C
alibration 
SSE/T 
Prediction 
SSE/T 
AIE  
Equal weighted 
model averaging 21 62 
Single run with 
lowest SSE/T 19 78 
Adaptive 
Expectations 
Equal weighted 
model averaging 41 102 
Single run 32 93 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis 201 93 
4 Conclusion and Implications 
The interactive network component of the AIE model 
improves the temporal predictive performance of the 
model over the adaptive expectations model.  Further, 
the result adds credibility to the network averaging as a 
technique to act as a proxy for networks that are unable 
to be measured or measured accurately.  Additionally, 
the superior predictive performance of AIE over the 
REH indicates that px is a superior model of choice 
than the utility maximising agent and rational choice 
theory assumptions in REH for this D&B (2008) profit 
survey. 
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